The story of the Cuban Missile Crisis began with the revolution in Cuba. Fulgencio President John F. Kennedy and his advisors were presented with a daunting challenge on the morning of October 16, 1962. 7 They had to determine what should be done about the Soviet offensive missiles on America's doorstep. In the days that followed, this group of men traded ideas and suggestions for what the United States should do in response to the Soviet actions.
Members of the group had ideas, and a decision was made as each man, and the group as a whole, weighed the consequences of each option. For JFK and virtually all of his advisors, nonaction was never an option. 8 The missiles had to be removed; this was the goal of all of the discussions and suggestions that followed. The decision that US action was necessary came because the President's advisors thought that non-action would hurt world opinion of America, would be bad for its alliances, and would weaken its position if the United States was challenged over Berlin. 9 The type of action to be taken came down to two alternatives: military action (mainly in the form of an air strike) and non-military action (mainly in the form a blockade).
Lines were drawn between, and within, these two camps and were influenced by what their respective proponents perceived the consequences would be. Those in the air strike camp shared some views of the consequences; however, they differed on other issues. One point of agreement amongst those arguing for an air strike was on the response of the Soviet Union to such an act. States, 1961 States, -1963 allies should be informed prior to an attack, but the USSR, the OAS, and NATO should be told as the strike was taking place. Rusk thought the opinion of the world would be on the United States' side, as would a good number of US allies. 17 Chip Bohlen, a Soviet expert, and previous ambassador to the USSR, was wary of an unannounced strike even though he supported nonmilitary courses of action, 18 while Dean Acheson thought the United States should alert allies, but not consult anyone. 19 Consequence-fueled disagreements also arose over the nature of the attack. McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in favor of a strike against the missile sites and all other offensive weapons (primarily planes), while Dean Acheson, Bundy, Rusk, and
McCone supported a smaller strike against the missile sites. 20 General Taylor argued that the Soviets could still attack the US if only the MRBM sites were taken out, but Bundy pointed out that a surgical strike would be advantageous because it would eliminate the missiles that were the cause of the entire problem. 21 Those who advocated an air strike also thought that a blockade would be too little too late because it would not solve the problem of the existing missiles. 22 The other choice before Kennedy and his advisors was non-military action. Most of the people who advocated non-military action did so because they feared the negative results that a strike on Cuba would bring. The fear of a Soviet response leading to general (and probably nuclear) war was a major reason several people involved in the decision-making process advocated taking non-military action. This was a reason why Ambassador to the United Nations, States, 1961 States, -1963 brother and Attorney General, came to support the blockade plan. 23 McNamara also stated that he thought an air strike against all the missiles in Cuba was impractical. 24 However, the bigger argument against military action (in particular a surprise attack) was that it was too reminiscent of Pearl Harbor. George Ball, Under Secretary of State stated this concern, as did Robert Kennedy and McNamara. 25 The morality of an air strike was the most discussed matter of the first five days of the crisis according to Robert Kennedy. 26 In addition, RFK touted a blockade's flexibility and "fewer liabilities…." 27 Other arguments against an air strike were that the United States' relationship with its allies would be hurt if the US acted without telling them 28 and that a blockade would force Khrushchev to make the next move, be it escalation of the situation, negotiation of the issues, or removal of the missiles. 29 As the time for a decision drew near, peoples' opinions began to change regarding the type action that the United Sates should take, and this was driven by what the perceived consequences would be. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, who had been a member of the air strike faction, came to support a blockade, thinking that starting with an air strike would cause great a risk of escalation, and that an attack without consultation was immoral. 30 He also advocated a 23 States, 1961 States, -1963 . This was the biggest issue for RFK. He stated that "America's traditions and history would not permit such a course of action [a surprise air strike]… This, I said, could not be undertaken by the U.S. if we were to maintain our moral position at home and around the globe. Our struggle against Communism throughout the world was far more than physical survival-it had as its essence our heritage and our ideals, and these we must not destroy." Kennedy, Thirteen Days, 16, 17. George Ball's title can be found in Ibid., 8. 26 blockade because it provided a "pause" so that further action could be decided. 31 
CIA Director
McCone and Secretary Dillon stated that an air strike could come as a consequence to Soviet refusal to remove the missiles after a blockade was implemented and an ultimatum issued. 32 As the decision-making process continued, the group appeared to unite behind a blockade. 33 However, several differences of opinion emerged as to what should follow such a blockade.
Some thought that the United States should attempt to negotiate removal of the missiles. 34 McNamara thought an ultimatum was too risky and that the United States would have to make some concessions in order to get the missiles removed, and Adlai Stevenson believed the United States should suggest a summit meeting to negotiate missile removal because they would end up in one anyway. 35 McCone stated that he was opposed to any attempts to negotiate missile removal, thinking they would hurt relations with allies in the Western Hemisphere; Dillon joined him in his opposition to negotiations. 36 As seen, the options that were suggested by Kennedy's advisors were influenced by what the perceived consequences to certain courses of action would be. However, the primary decision maker in this situation was the President himself, and his decision was the one that mattered most. As Robert Kennedy said, "it was now up to one single man. No committee was going to make this decision." 37 On October 20, 1962 President John F. Kennedy decided to go with the blockade-ultimatum option, with a possible air strike coming later, if necessary. 38 The main 31 May and Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes, 190. 32 John McCone, Douglass Dillon, and Robert Kennedy favored this idea Ibid., 196, 197 . It also should be noted that ascertaining exactly how consequence analysis influenced the switch by John McCone and Douglas Dillon is rather difficult given the ambiguity of the sources used in this paper on the issue. 33 Ibid., 171. 34 Ibid., 191. 35 The air strike group was headed by McGeorge Bundy, and had Douglass Dillon, Dean Acheson, and General Taylor. McCone was asked to join this group, but thought that he should refrain because of his position on the Intelligence Board. 62 The groups met and then came back together and critiqued each other's plan. While this was taking place, a seismic event occurred in the decision making process. 63 Both Secretaries Dillon and McNamara suggested that an air strike could come sometime after the blockade, and Robert Kennedy began to argue for a blockade as an initial action with others following, thinking that this was the obvious course of action. 64 The meeting adjourned with the seeds of compromise firmly planted in the minds of the advisors, seeds that would soon bear the fruit of changed minds in the meetings to come. The president returned the next day for the meeting that would decide the course the US would take in response to the Soviet threat. 65 The fate of humanity hung in the balance as the National Security Council met on the 20 th of October 1962. 66 and Ted Sorenson). 67 The impact of the suggestion to merge the blockade and air strike routes can be seen in that both Dillon and McCone, who the previous day had supported the air strike, had changed positions to favor beginning US action with a blockade. Evidence of the compromise was further seen when McCone stated that he was opposed to an air strike, but also did not think the blockade was sufficient to meet the challenge. Also, both McCone and Dillon suggested that a time period of seventy-two hours be given to the Russians to remove the missiles, and an air strike be conducted if they did not comply. 68 States, 1961 States, -1963 negotiation should follow the blockade while Adlai Stevenson pressed that the United States offer to make concessions around the world. 69 Kennedy, however vetoed any US concessions, or suggested negotiations at the beginning, and had made his decision in favor of a blockade, coupled with an ultimatum and possibly an air strike. 70 Later, he confirmed to John McCone that he had chosen the blockade-ultimatum position advocated by McCone. 71 The next day, this decision was solidified in several choices the president made with regard to his speech to the nation; however, he remained somewhat aloof as to exactly what would come after the missileremoval demand. 72 The effects that consequence analysis and compromise between and combination of available options is very evident in President Kennedy's address to the nation on October 22, 1962, detailing the Cuban Missile Crisis and the United State's response. 73 Kennedy reiterates his view that escalation to nuclear war and the moral problems with a surprise attack on Cuba are the two main consequences he wished to avoid. He flatly stated America's opposition to war, adding, "We have no wish to war with the Soviet Union…." Kennedy also asserted his belief that the course of action chosen by the United States was consistent with the character of the United States. 74 In addition, Kennedy spoke of the superior moral character of the United States, especially when compared to the Soviet Union. 75 The compromises and combinations of options that resulted in the decision made by the President are apparent in his speech, too. In particular, he had decided to side with McCone and Dillon by leaving room for an air strike or any other action in case it was necessary. 76 He stated that the current action "may only be the beginning," and that the army was being readied for any action. 78 Furthermore, JFK says he was unsure of how the situation will turn out, and multiple times he said that the United States would meet Soviet action with a necessary response. 79 The compromise is further seen in the fact that an ultimatum (further showing his choice of the blockade-ultimatum track 80 ) was issued to Khrushchev, with promised action if the order was not heeded, 81 and in the calls for diplomatic action (something suggested by Chip Bohlen 82 ) in the OAS and the UN. 83 Also worth noting is that president Kennedy did not invite Khrushchev to a summit, but invited him to end the arms race. This is yet another example of a rejection of the blockade-negotiate plan. 84 In conclusion, the American decision to blockade the island of Cuba in response to the Soviet deployment of missiles to that island during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was the result of consequence analysis on the part of the decision makers, as well as the compromising
